基于信號(hào)傳遞博弈的貨車司機(jī)保險(xiǎn)利益和貸款收益分析

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中圖分類號(hào)：F540；F224.3 文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)志碼：A

Abstract：In order to resolve the issue of diffcult insurance and loan in the freight truck operations，a signaling game model is constructed to analyze the internal mechanisms between claim signal and insurance benefits，as well as mileage signal and loan income. Under the separation equilibrium， insurance companies can obtain the drivers’driving risk types through claim behaviors，and lending institutions can know the drivers’operating ability through mileage information. Driving risks can affect insurance benefits，mainly manifested in changes in audit costs and adjustments in compensation levels. Through signal cost screening and the design of reward and punishment mechanisms，lending institutions make it easier for freight drivers with strong operating ability to obtain loans，and at the same time curb the speculative behavior of drivers with weak operating ability.Freight drivers demonstrating their risks and operational characteristics to financial institutions can help them obtain more appropriate insurance and loan services.Financial institutions that optimize risk management and credit decision-making can alleviate the issue of freight drivers’difficulty in obtaining insurances and loans to some extent.The analysis results provide suggestions for product selection for diferent types of freight drivers，and provide theoretical support for the stable development of the freight finance market and the improvement of logistics transportation safety.

Key words： network freight； freight insurance；loan；signaling game

0 引言

公路貨物運(yùn)輸是“十四五”規(guī)劃綱要中多次提及的重點(diǎn)發(fā)展領(lǐng)域。（剩余16496字）